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The objective of this thesis is to develop an Annualized Cost of Leaving 
(ACOL) model to predict Naval aviator separation decisions in response to changes 
in aviation bonus pays, specifically Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) and Aviation 
Career Incentive Pay (ACIP). The ACOL approach models an individual's decision 
to stay or leave the military based on the monetary differences between alternative are 
incorporated into the decision modeling process. The model assumes that individuals 
will stay in the military if the positive difference between expected military pay and 
expected civilian pay (the cost-of-leaving) exceeds the distaste for the military 
lifestyle. Officer Master File (OMF) data from the Defense Manpower Data Center 
(DMDC) and data developed by Turner (NPS 1995) were used to determine 
individual characteristics and to compute the present value of the expected military 
pay stream. Census Bureau data were used to estimate future expected civilians 
earnings. A logit regression model was developed to simulate the retention ofNaval 
aviators in response to changes in the ACOL due to increases in ACIP or ACP. The 
results indicate that the proposed increases in either ACIP or ACP are cost effective 
ways of increasing the retention of Naval aviators. 
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A. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE 
The training ofNaval aviators, both pilots and Naval Flight Officers (NFO) is 
one of the most expensive investments in human capital undertaken by the 
Department of the Navy. To achieve an acceptable level of return on this investment, 
sufficient retention of Naval aviators must be achieved. To assist in maintaining a 
high enough level of retention, the Navy provides financial incentives, in the form of 
aviation bonus pays, to aviators to induce them to stay in. the Navy. The aviation 
bonus pays are Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP) and Aviation Career Pay 
(ACP). ACIP is a monthly payment given to all Naval aviators. ACIP reaches its 
maximum value of$650 a month at the point when Naval aviators have completed the 
initial service obligation incurred from flight training and must make a decision to 
· stay in or leave the Navy. The other aviation bonus pay, ACP, is offered to aviators 
in selected communities when shortages of experienced mid-career pilots and NFOs 
are projected. ACP payments are currently up to $12,000 per year for as long as 9 
years. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the effects of proposed increases in 
these aviation bonus pays on the retention of Naval aviators. 
B. SCOPE AND GOALS 
The approach used to examine hypothetical increases in aviation bonus pays 
on retention is to use an Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model to compare the 
differences between an individual's expected future earnings if he chooses to stay in 
the Navy and continue a military career versus leaving the Navy to pursue a civilian 
career. The model allows changes in the cost-of-leaving variable in response to 
increases in aviation bonus payments to simulate the effect of the bonuses on 
retention behavior. Additionally, the ACOL model incorporates an individual's 
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preference, or "taste," for military and civilian life when making the 
retention/separation decision. The goals of this thesis are: 
1. To develop an Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model for Naval 
aviators; 
2. To develop a logit regression model, using the ACOL framework, to 
predict retention of Naval aviators; 
3. To apply the logit retention model to simulate the effects of increases 
in aviation bonus pays on the retention ofNaval aviators. 
The benefit of this thesis to the Navy is in determining potential aviator 
replacement cost savings possible through increases in aviation bonus pays. 
According to L T Mike Martin, of PERS 211 (Aviation Community Managers) 
currently, the Navy spends $12,000,000 a year on ACP and $74,600,000 a year on 
ACIP. By increasing the amounts available to these programs, retention of Navy 
aviators is expected to improve. 
Chapter II provides an introduction to the ACOL model and a review of 
relevant literature. The data and methodology used in this thesis are presented in 
Chapter III. Chapter IV presents the analytical results of changes to aviation bonus 
pays on the retention of Naval aviators. Finally, Chapter V offers conclusions and 
recommendations concerning aviation bonus pays and future areas of research. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. THE ANNUALIZED COST OF LEAVING MODEL 
The Annualized Cost of Leaving model, or ACOL, is an econometric model 
developed by Warner and Goldberg (1984) to predict whether a service member will 
stay or leave the military after finishing his obligated service. The assumption behind 
ACOL is that individuals make career choices so as to maximize their utility, 
including the monetary returns. Decision makers balance the cost and benefits to 
them of each choice, weighing both monetary and nonpecuniary aspects of the 
decision. Thus, when a service member is trying to decide on whether to stay in the 
military, ACOL assumes the individual weighs the perceived cost and benefits of the 
alternatives of staying in the military or leaving immediately for civilian employment. 
Cymrot (1987) states that although the ACOL model concentrates on monetary 
aspects, the taste or preference for military service is equally important when deciding 
whether or not to stay in the military. Some individuals will remain in the service 
even though they could make more money as a civilian. To some people, the travel, 
type of work, or patriotism makes military service preferable to any civilian employ-
ment. On the other hand, some people prefer being a civilian, even if their military 
pay is higher than what they can earn in the civilian labor market. In the ACOL 
framework, there will be individuals with a negative cost ofleaving who nonetheless, 
will stay in the military; conversely, others with a positive cost of leaving will 
separate nonetheless. 
After an individual completes his initial obligated term of service, he must 
choose between remaining in the military or leaving to pursue a civilian career. The 
decision to stay or leave the military is made by comparing the utility of leaving 
immediately with the utility of staying in the military for n more years, where n = 
3 
1,2, ... s and s represents the maximum allowable future years of service. As stated 
earlier, the utility of this decision is affected both by monetary considerations, in the 
form of the individual's expected future earnings, and by non-monetary factors, such 
as net preferences for a civilian lifestyle. 
If an individual chooses to stay in the Navy for n more years, then his 
expected future earnings are comprised of the present value of two pay streams. The 
first is the present value of future military pay. The second is the present value of 
post-service military retirement pay and any post-retirement civilian pay. If an officer 
chooses to leave the Navy, his future earnings are determip.ed solely by the present 
value of his civilian pay beginning at the time of separation. The non-monetary factor 
affecting this decision to stay or leave is defined as an individual's preference, or 
"taste", for a military lifestyle or a civilian lifestyle. By assigning a monetary 
equivalent to an individual's preference for a military or civilian lifestyle, a net 
·preference for a civilian lifestyle can be determined. 
If an officer's cost of leaving, calculated using the present values of the future 
earnings streams, is greater than his net preference for civilian lifestyle, the model 
hypothesizes that he will choose to stay in the military. To express this, Warner and 
Goldberg used the following definitions: 
~ = the individuals's expected military pay in each future year of service, 
j = l, ... s 
Rjn = the yearly retired pay the individual will receive after n more years of 
service, with}= n+ l, ... T, where T equals life expectancy. 
Wj0 = the future civilian earnings stream the individual expects to receive if 
he leaves the military immediately,}= l, ... T 
Wjn = the future civilian earnings stream the individual expects to receive if 
he leaves the military after n more years of service,}= n+ l, ... T 
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p = the individuals yearly discount rate 
(1/(l+p)Y = the present value of one dollar received j years in the future, at 
the time of the stay or leave decision, where}= l, ... T 
Let Ym and Yc denote the annual monetary equivalents, or preferences, of the 
non-monetary aspects of military and civilian life, respectively. Warner and Goldberg 
assumed these factors to be fixed over time for any given individual, but that they 
vary across individuals. 
The utility of remaining in the military is greater than the utility of leaving the 
military immediately only if: 
t Mj+Ym + t Rjn+Wjn+Yc> t Wjo+Yc' 
j=l (1+p)1 j=n+l (1+p)j j=l (1+p)j 
where the first summation on the left-hand side is the present value of military pay 
plus the preference for military life, over the period of n more years of military 
service. The second summation on the left-hand side is the present value of post-
service retirement pay plus post-service civilian pay until death. The right-hand side 
of the equation represents the summation of the present value of civilian pay plus the 
- preference for civilian life if the individual leaves the service immediately. 
The condition for remaining in the military can also be expressed as: 
Cn=t Mj + t Rjn+Wjn t Wjo >(Yc-Ym)t . 
j=l (1 =p)1 j=n+l (1 +p)1 j=l (1 +p)1 J=l (1 +p)1 




j=l (1 +p)1 
where en is the "cost of leaving" or the difference between the present value of the 
two pay streams and o is the net preference for civilian life over military life, (Yc-
Ym ). According to Hogan and Black ( 1991) , o can be thought of as the amount the 
individual would be willing to pay each year to be a civilian/not be in the military if 
annual military and civilian compensation were the same. 
By dividing both sides of the equation by 
n 1 
:E-
j=l (1 +p) 
the condition for remaining in the military becomes: 




where An is the annualized cost of leaving, or ACOL, over the period of n more years 
of service and o is the net preference for civilian life. 
Using this model, an individual prefers a strategy of remaining in the military 
for n more years to a strategy of leaving immediately only if the annualized cost of 
leaving exceeds the net preference for civilian life, or An > o. An individual will 
choose a strategy of leaving immediately to any strategy that involves remaining in 
the military only if An < o for all n = 1, ... s. According to Hogan (1995), this is 
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equivalent to finding the maximum difference between military pay and the best 
alternative for the horizon, s, or max An < o. It follows that if this maximum 
difference is not sufficient to induce an individual to stay in the Navy, then no lessor 
An would be either. Therefore, the relevant ACOL value for the retention decision 
is the maximum over the set (A1 ••• A5), and the relevant time horizon for the retention 
decision is the one over which the ACOL value is maximized. 
Because the monetary value of an individual's preference for civilian life (Y c-
y m) cannot be observed, it is assumed that these differences are a function of a vector 
of individual characteristics, Xi, and a random error component, ei. So, the decision 
rule for individual I to remain in the military for at least one more year is: A COLi + 
bXi > e, where b is a vector of parameters, and X is a vector of individual 
characteristics. 
To estimate retention using the ACOL model, Cymrot(1989) states: 
In the ACOL model the underlying distribution of preferences for 
military service has generally been assumed to fit a logistic distribution. 
This assumption of a logistic distribution is made because it provides 
a reasonable fit of the data and is relatively easy to use. The logistic 
distribution is symmetrical and has a declining density in its tails. This 
shape implies that changes in the cost of leaving have a larger impact 
on the retention rate when the retention rate is in the middle range, that 
is, between 0.2 and 0.8, than when it is at either extreme. This 
implication is thought to have intuitive appeal because it suggests that 
the number of individuals with extreme preferences, either strongly for 
or strongly against military service, is relatively small. If preferences 
are distributed logistically, the retention model can be estimated using 
the maximum likelihood technique known as logit. 





where r; represents the probability of individual I remaining in the military, B and y 
are parameters to be estimated, and X is the vector of individual characteristics. 
Warner and Goldberg estimated the expected military pay stream by calculat-
ing promotion probabilities by years of service (YOS) and pay grade. Post-service 
earnings were estimated from data on enlisted personnel who left the Navy after one 
term of service. The post-service earnings function included personal characteristics, 
such as education, race, branch of service, and both linear and quadratic terms for 
years of post-service experience. In estimating retention models for 16 Navy enlisted 
occupation codes, Warner and Goldberg found "that variation in ACOL explains 
much of the variation in the probability of reenlisting." They found that for most first-
term Navy enlisted personnel, the maximum ACOL, max Am is found over a four-
year reenlistment. Only using a 10 percent discount rate (p=.1), which they believe 
to be too low for enlisted personnel, do Warner and Goldberg find ACOL values 
calculated over a horizon of20 years of service (where retirement benefits are vested) 
to be greater than ACOL values calculated over four more years of service. 
Furthermore, married individuals have a higher reenlistment rate than single 
personnel. They speculate this is due to the greater value of non-monetary benefits 
available to married personnel, primarily the health care benefits for their dependents. 
Although Warner and Goldberg's model examined the retention decisions of 
enlisted personnel, it also can be applied to the officer community, with some 
modification. The main difference between officer and enlisted retention decisions 
involves the period of future service. Enlisted personnel reenlist for a fixed number 
of years, specified in the reenlistment contract. Officers are required to complete a 
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minimum service requirement (MSR), such as six years after completion of flight 
training. After completion of the MSR, an officer can choose to separate at any time. 
One similarity between the two groups, however, is that both officers and enlisted 
personnel must examine expected pay streams over some future period to determine 
the benefits and cost of staying. 
B. APPLICATIONS OF THE ANNUALIZED COST OF LEAVING 
MODEL 
In his study on the effect of selected reenlistment bonuses on the retention of 
Marine Corps enlisted personnel, Cymrot (1987) uses the ACOL approach to predict 
retention. As expected, Cymrot found that increases in reenlistment bonus amounts 
increase retention. His findings also show that military rank is positively correlated 
with retention; specifically, the higher the rank of the enlisted Marine, the more likely 
he is to remain in the Marine Corps. This is consistent with the ACOL model in that 
higher-ranking individuals are paid more than lower ranking individuals and, in 
addition, they have demonstrated a preference for military life by staying the 
additional years required to achieve their rank. 
Smith et al (1991) in a study of Army enlisted retention decisions using a 
variation of the ACOL model, called the ACOL-2 model, emphasize the extent of use 
of the ACOL model. They state, "because theoretical advantages are combined with 
relatively straightforward estimation, the ACOL model is the most commonly used 
approach in reenlistment modeling." Smith et al estimated military pay streams, 
taking promotion times into account, by including basic pay, housing pays, and 
sustenance pay. They did not include special pays, such as parachute jump pay, due 
to the inconsistent payment of the majority of the special pays. Civilian earnings 
were computed to age 65, defined as a standard retirement age, to avoid the 
complications of civilian retirement earnings and possible social security earnings. 
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Using their estimation of future military and civilian earnings and a discount rate of 
10 percent, Smith et al found that an individual's maximum ACOL value "involves 
completing a military career through 20 year of service," which is the point of 
retirement benefits vesting. They estimate that soldiers with dependents have a higher 
probability of reenlisting than single soldiers. This is due to their higher monetary 
compensation, in the form of a greater housing allowance, and greater non-monetary 
benefits, such as medical care for dependents and subsidized day care. They also 
found that black soldiers, and to a lesser extent other minority soldiers, are more 
likely to reenlist than white soldiers. 
C. REVIEW OF PERSONAL DISCOUNT RATE STUDIES 
An important factor in the ACOL model is the individual's discount rate,p, 
which affects the present values of all future earnings streams. Smith et al (1991) 
state, " a lower discount rate, besides raising the average ACOL value, gives more 
weight to the post-service differences in the military and civilian pay streams, and to 
retirement pay." 
Warner and Pleeter (1995) define the personal discount rate as "the rate at 
which individual's trade current dollars for future dollars," and as " the rate at which 
an individual discounts money streams in decisions involving choices over time." 
Their analysis of prior discount rate studies finds that: 
1. Individuals do not discount all future values at the same rate. Their 
research shows discount rates to be high for small sums of money and lower for large 
sums. Specifically, Warner and Pleeter cite Gilman (1976) who found discount rates 
ranged from about 16.2 percent for young individuals with low incomes to 8.5 percent 
for older persons with high incomes. In similar research, Warner and Pleeter quote 
Black (1984) who estimated discount rates of officers and enlisted. Black estimated 
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officers have an average discount rate of 10.3 percent and enlisted have an average 
discount rate of 12.5 percent. 
2. Discount rates vary with personal characteristics. It is common for 
discount rates to decline as age, education and income increase. In the context of 
military service, this supports the belief that officers, who are on average older, better 
educated, and paid at a higher rate, have lower discount rates than enlisted personnel. 
In their study on separation incentives in the Navy, Warner and Pleeter 
estimated an average real discount rate for officers of 15.5 percent. The real discount 
rates ranged between 8 and 20 percent. Warner and Pleeter find that officer discount 
rates are on average 10 percentage points lower than enlisted discount rates. 
Nord and Schmitz (1985) state, "the higher an individual's discount rate, the 
more strongly he or she prefers current to future income and, conversely the less he 
or she cares about changes in· the expected value of future income." Nord and 
Schmitz cite several previous studies that estimated discount rates ranging between 
1.2 and 30 percent. These estimates are displayed in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1. Nord and Schmitz Results of Previous Studies on 
Estimated Discount Rates 
Study Discount Rate 
Friedman (1957) 30% 
Landsberger ( 1971) 9-27% 
Heckman (1976) 18-20% 
Rosen (1976) 7.2-8.7% 
Hausman (1979) 10-39% 
Air Conditioner Purchases 
Leffler and Lindsay (1981) 10% 
Applications to Med School 
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Table 2.1 (Continued) 
Study Discount Rate 
Gilman (1976) 
Decisions to participate in 1.2-24% 
pension plans 
Cylke, Goldberg, Hogan, Mairs 
(1982) Response to lump sum 16-20% 
vs. installment reenlistment 
bonuses in the Navy 
Black (1983) 12.5% 
Cylke et al (1982) find that Navy enlisted personnel have a discount rate of 
approximately 17 percent, and state that most previous analysis requiring use of 
discount rates have erroneously used discount rates in the area of 10 percent for 
enlisted personnel. Using Warner and Pleeter's findings that officers have discount 
rates approximately 10 points lower than enlisted, the Cylke et al study would imply 
that officers have personal discount rates of 7 percent. 
D. REVIEW OF AVIATION BONUSES 
Beginning in January 1989, the Navy replaced the Aviation Officer Continua-
tion Program (AOCP) with the Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP) program. ACP is 
a monetary compensation tool used to retain mid-grade aviation officers. As Navy 
aviators complete their initial minimum service requirement, generally between the 
sixth and seventh year of service, they are eligible to leave the Navy. As more and 
more aviators choose to leave, critical shortages of mid-grade Lieutenant 
Commanders, who serve as aviation squadron department heads or officers in charge 
began to develop in certain aviation communities. ACP bonuses are offered to 
communities with projected shortages. The size of the bonus depends on the 
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projected shortage of the aviation sub-community in question. Currently, the 
maximum bonus allowed by law is $12,000 a year. 
The ACP bonus is offered to aviators in selected communities with six to 
twelve years of service. Aviators have two options, the long-term and short-term 
choices. By accepting a long-term contract, the aviator obligates himself to stay until 
the end of the 14th year of service, long enough to fill the critical mid-grade LCDR 
shortage. The payment, up to $12,000 per year of service specified in the contract, 
can be received in one of two ways: (1) either as a lump sum of 50 percent of the 
total value of the payment paid at the time of the contract, with the remainder is paid 
in equal yearly payments over the life of the contract, with the last payment received 
at the time of the expiration of the obligation, or (2) in equal yearly payments 
beginning on the date of the contract and ending at the expiration of the obligation. 
For example, an aviator at the start of the eighth year of service who accepts a long 
·term contract of $12,000 per year would receive a total of$84,000 (7 * $12,000) for 
a commitment of7 more years of service. Of this amount, $42,000 would be received 
at the commencement of the contract, with seven additional annual payments of 
$6,000 each if the aviator chose the first option. They could also opt for 7 annual 
payments of$12,000 each. 
The short-term contract is offered for contract obligations of one or two years. 
These contracts are valued at half the yearly rate of the long term contracts in the 
same community and are paid in equal yearly installments, beginning at the date of 
the contract and ending at the end of the contract. Appendix A shows the ACP offers 
for the years studied in this report. As can be seen in Appendix A, ACP is primarily 
offered to jet pilots. In addition to having the greatest shortages of mid-grade LCDRs, 
jet pilots have the most extensive training and replacement cost. (This will be 
addressed in Chapter IV). 
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The other aviation bonus is the Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP), 
commonly referred to as monthly flight pay. ACIP covers the first 25 years of 
service, but it affects more than just the critical mid-grade aviators. ACIP is payed 
to all aviators, both pilots and NFOs, regardless of their community. The schedule 
of ACIP payments is shown in Table 2.2. As can be seen in Table 2.2, ACIP reaches 
its maximum value of $650 a month at the six-year point in an aviator's career. This 
six-year point coincides with the point at which Naval aviators are beginning to 
complete their minimum service requirement (MSR) incurred from flight training. 
At the 18+ year point, the monthly value of ACIP begins to decrease. 
Table 2.2. Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP) Monthly 
Payment Amounts by Years of Aviation Service 
Years of Monthly ACIP 
Aviation Service Payment 
Amount 
2 or less $125 
over2 $156 
over 3 $188 
over4 $206 
over 6 $650 
over 18 $585 
over 20 $495 
over 22 $385 
over 25 $250 
Source: 1992 Navy Pay Table 
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. DESCRIPTION OF DATA 
In order to analyze the separation decisions of Navy aviators, data was 
collected from the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) in Monterey, CA. Data 
on all active duty and active duty reserve aviation officers was taken from the 1990, 
1992, 1993, and 1994 Officer Master Files (OMF). Additional data on this same 
population was taken from a unique data base examining Navy aviators developed by 
Turner (1995). These two databases were merged to develop the final working data 
set, which had a total sample size of 4 7, 166 observations covering years 1990, 1992-
1994. 
A number of restrictions were imposed on the data. Officers with more than 
4 years of prior enlisted service were removed to eliminate demonstrated preference 
or taste for military life that may not compare to that of the typical newly-
commissioned officer. Additionally, officers with more than 4 years of prior enlisted 
service are paid at higher basic pay than their counterparts without prior service, so 
their expected military pay will be higher than their peers of equal rank and years of 
service. Female aviators were also deleted from the sample. One reason for this 
deletion is that women represent only 1.8 percent of the total aviation population. 
Only active duty Navy pilots and flight officers with designators 1310, 1315, 
1320, and 1325 are the subject of this thesis. Thus, aviators in training, aviators with 
training and administration of reserve designator (TAR) and, general aviation officers 
(such as meteorologist) were excluded from the sample. 
Consistent with the assumption used by Goldberg (1982), we assume that the 
individual's decision to remain in the military involves the decision of leaving now 
or staying until 20 years of service in order to receive military retirement pay. If an 
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individual chooses to separate from the military, he will leave immediately. 
Consequently, aviators with 20 or more years of service were removed from the 
sample population. 
A via tors with less than six years of service were removed from the sample. 
The majority of aviators are still obligated to military service under minimum service 
requirements (MSR) incurred during flight school until the sixth year of service 
(Cymrot (1989)). All aviators still under this initial minimum service requirements 
(MSR) or obligated by previous ACP contract are unable to make a voluntary stay or 
leave decision and thus were deleted from the data set. 
Aviators whose age was less than 25 at six years of service or whose age at 
20 years of service (retirement eligibility) is greater than 53 were discarded from the 
sample. This restricts the age of entry into the Navy to a range from 19 to 33 years 
old. Finally, aviators with missing or incomplete data and aviators who left the Navy 
·prior to the years observed were removed from the sample. 
The restrictions listed above reduced the original sample of 47,166 to 15,832 
observations. These remaining observations consist only of individuals who are "at-
risk," that is, are eligible to make a voluntary retention/separation decision. Table 3.1 
shows some descriptive statistics for the final sample of aviators. On average, those 
who left the Navy were younger, had fewer years of service, were less likely to be 
married and had fewer dependents than those who chose to stay in the Navy. 
Minority representation is slightly lower in the set of aviators who chose to remain in 
the Navy. The retention rate for this population of at-risk aviators was 92.6 percent. 
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Table 3.1 Mean Values of Selected Variables of "At-Risk" Navy 
Aviators, in Years 1990, 1992-1994 
Total Population Leavers Stayers 
Sample 
Age 34.97 31.34 35.26 
Retirement Age 43.25 - 41.19 
Years of Service 11.71 7.32 12.06 
Marital Status (%) 83.7% 70.5% 84.7% 
Dependents 2.05 1.35 2.10 
Minority (%) 3.2% 5.51% 3.10% 
Sample Size 15,832 1,179 14,653 
Source: DMDC and Turner(1995). 
B. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
The empirical model follows the literature reviewed in Chapter II and adopts 
the utility maximization framework of the ACOL model in explaining the retention 
and separation decisions of Navy aviators. The variables used in this analysis are 
presented below. These variables were assumed to significantly affect an aviator's 
decision to stay or leave the Navy. 
1. Variable Construction and Definitions 
a. The Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable STAY was constructed from the separation date 
(Sepdate) and the date of separation (DOS) variables in the final data set. If an 
individual aviator left the Navy duringthe period studied, then STAY was coded 0. 
If the individual aviator chose to stay in the Navy then STAY was coded 1. 
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b. Calculation of the ACOL Variable 
To compute the Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) it was assumed 
that individuals form their expectations of future earnings based on information about 
expected future military pay and promotion opportunities if they stay and expected 
future civilian earnings potential if they leave. Since military retirement is not offered 
until a service member reaches 20 years of service, it is assumed that when an 
individual decides to stay in the military he will serve until 20 years then leave with 
retirement benefits and pursue a civilian career. This follows the assumption used by 
Goldberg (1982) in his study of mid-career (third term) enlisted personnel. Further-
more, all dollar values used in this analysis have been converted to 1991 values using 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) values contained in the Economic Report of The 
President ( 1995). 
To calculate estimated military pay until retirement, a pay grade 
distribution by years of service for aviators was created using the 1992 Officer Master 
File from DMDC. The resulting probability of being in a certain rank by year of 
service was combined with the 1991 military pay table to obtain expected monthly 
basic pay, basic allowance for quarter (BAQ) conditioned on dependent status, federal 
insurance contribution act (FICA) deductions, and monthly aviation career incentive 
pay (ACIP). Following Warner and Goldberg (1984) special pays were not included 
in computing military pay because they are small relative to basic pay, BAQ, and 
aviation bonus pays, and are designed as a compensating wage differential for 
undesirable job characteristics of certain military duties. 
To determine the value of Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP), all Naval 
aviators who were eligible to receive ACP in the years examined were assumed to 
include the maximum amount of ACP allowed when considering their future military 
pay stream. It was also assumed that as utility maximizing individuals, all ACP-
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eligible aviators would choose the 50 percent lump-sum followed by equal annual 
installment payments option over the equal payments option in order to maximize the 
present value of the ACP payments. Expected future military retirement pay was 
calculated as 50 percent of an individual's expected base pay at 20 years of service. 
The present value of the total military pay stream associated with 
staying until 20 years of service is represented by summing the discounted values of 
annual military pay, includingACIP andACP, until20 years of service and the values 
of military retirement pay from the age of retirement until age 65. Military retirement 
pay and later, civilian earnings were computed until age 65, not until life expectancy, 
T, as in Warner and Goldberg (1984). This was done to reduce computational 
complexity and because of the difficulty of determining civilian retirement payments 
and social security benefits received from age 65 until death. Following Cylke et al 
(1982), Goldberg (1982) and Warner and Goldberg (1984), a discount rate often 
percent was used throughout the analysis. 
A military retiree was assumed to join the civilian labor market and 
work until retirement age of 65. To obtain a civilian age-earnings profile for this 
period we used data from the 1990 Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) from the 
decennial census of the United States. The PUMS data contains records representing 
a 5 percent sample of the housing units in the United States and the persons in them 
and was prepared by the Bureau of the Census. The sample population was restricted 
to only male military veterans. Furthermore, these veterans must have had a college 
degree or greater education, to approximate officer status. Controlling for age, 
marital status and whether or not the individual received military retirement benefits, 
an age-earnings profile was calculated to estimate expected future civilian earnings 
until age 65. The present value of civilian income after military retirement is the sum 
of the discounted annual civilian pay from age at military retirement until age 65. 
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The present value of the military pay stream and post-retirement civilian earnings 
were summed to get an individual's estimated monetary value of staying in the 
military. 
The same age-earnings profile was used to compute the expected annual 
civilian earnings for individuals who choose to leave the military before 20 years of 
service. Consistent with Warner and Goldberg ( 1987), service members who leave 
prior to 20 years of service have higher predicted civilian earnings than those 
individual who stay until retirement (20 YOS). Discounting an individual's annual 
civilian income and summing these values from current age until age 65 provides the 
estimated present value of the civilian income stream if an individual were to leave 
the military immediately. 
The cost ofleaving (COL) value was calculated for each individual as 
the difference between the present value of staying in the military for 20 years and the 
present value of leaving the military immediately. This is summarized in the 
following formula: COL = (Present Value of military pay + military retirement pay 
+post-retirement civilian earnings) - (present value of civilian earnings if individual 
leaves immediately). The COL values were annualized using the 10 percent discount 
rate, conditioned on the number of years remaining until 20 years of service. It is 
hypothesized that ACOL is positively correlated with the probability of staying. In 
other words, all else equal, the higher the ACOL value, the more likely an individual 
is to remain in the military. 
c. Demographic Variables 
Demographic variables are included in the retention model to capture 
effects of non-monetary factors affecting the individual's net taste for a civilian 
lifestyle. The following section describes the construction of these variables and their 
hypothesized effect on retention. 
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( 1) MARRIED. A dummy variable indicating marital status 
coded 1 if and individual is married and 0 otherwise. Although marital status was 
included in computation of the ACOL value, it also was included in the retention 
decision model to account for benefits, such as health care for the individual's spouse, 
that differ between married and single service members. It is expected that being 
married (Married= 1) is positively related to the decision to stay in the military. 
(2) NODEP. NODEP (number of dependents) is a 
continuous variable for the number of dependents. It is assumed that the greater the 
number of dependents an individual has, the more the individual values steady 
military pay and fringe benefits over the civilian sector. As mentioned in Chapter II, 
the non-monetary value of military service, specifically health care benefits, increases 
with the number of dependents. Therefore, it is hypothesized that NODEP is 
positively correlated with retention, i.e., as NODEP increases, so does an individual's 
likelihood of remaining in the military. 
(3) MINORITY. MINORITY(non-white,memberofracial 
minority). A dummy variable coded 1 if the individual is a racial minority and coded 
0 if the individual is Caucasian. Because the proportion of aviators who are 
minorities is small, this factor may be inconsequential in determining potential 
civilian earnings. However, civilian earnings for minorities tend to be lower, on 
average, than civilian earnings of non-minorities. This being the case, minorities are 
estimated to have higher ACOL values than non-minorities. Therefore, it is 
hypothesized that minority status will be positively related to remaining in the 
military. 
C. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Given the above variable descriptions, an aviator's decision to stay or leave 
the Navy is modeled using the following logit equation: Equation 3.1: 
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where the signs indicate the expected relation between the independent variable and 
the dependent variable (STAY). 
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IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This chapter presents the results of the empirical analysis and discusses the 
estimation methods used. 
A. METHODS 
Equation 3.1 was used to predict retention rates in response to bonus effects. 
The results are estimated by determining the average effect of the financial incentives, 
such as an increase in aviation bonus pay, on retention rates. For each individual 
Naval aviator in the sample, the probability of retention is predicted using the 
estimated logit model in equation 3.1 with the dollar value of the hypothetical 
increase in ACIP or ACP included in the ACOL value. This gives the individual's 
probability of staying when the financial incentive is included in the ACOL 
computation. We can also simulate the probability of staying when the additional 
bonus amount is not included in the ACOL variable. By taking the difference in the 
retention probabilities between these two states, an individual's net change in the 
probability of retention, due to the additional bonus pay, can be determined. The 
average effect of a particular bonus amount can be calculated for the entire sample 
using the following formula. 
Equation 4.1: 
f:1p _i=_l __ _ 
n 
where Puis an individual's simulated probability of staying (from equation 3.1) with 
the inclusion of an increase in bonus pay in the ACOL variable, and P2i is an 
individual's probability of staying (from equation 3.1) without including the increase 
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in bonus pay in the ACOL value, and n equals the number of observation in the 
sample. 
In addition to average program effects, the effect of changes in one's 
demographic characteristics were simulated using the notional person approach. 
Unlike linear probability models, such as ordinary least squares (OLS), logit 
coefficients are difficult to interpret. That is, in a linear probability model, the 
estimated coefficient gives the effect of a one unit increase in an independent variable 
on the change in probability of the outcome. In a logit model, the coefficients of the 
independent variables represent the logarithm of the odds ratio of the dependent 
variable. To interpret the logit model, a unit change in an independent variable must 
be examined at the mean values of the independent variables. This is done by 
constructing a notional or "representative" person. This is a fictitious individual 
whose values for continuous independent variable are set at the mean, or average, 
values for the entire sample. Values for dummy/dichotomous variables are set at 0 
or 1, depending on which value represents the majority of the sample. Holding all 
else constant, the effect of a continuous variable on the independent variable being 
estimated is determined by increasing its mean value by one unit. For dummy 
variables, the notional value is changed from 0 to 1, or 1 to 0, depending on which 
value is used in the notional person. By taking the difference between the notational 
(average) value and the "new" value of the explanatory variable, the change in 
probability for the dependent variable can be calculated. 
B. RESULT OF MODEL 
Table 4.1 provides the average ACOL value and retention rate for each year 
of commissioned service (YCS) cell in the data. 
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Table 4.1. Average ACOL Values and Actual Retention Rates by Years 
of Commissioned Service (YCS) 
YCS Observations Average ACOL ($) Retention Rate 
(o/o) 
6 2,007 $ 17,599 76.6 
7 2,745 $ 18,743 82.6 
8 1,390 $ 18,022 92.8 
9 766 $ 18,061 96.1 
10 610 $ 17,332 96.7 
11 555 $ 17,453 98.2 
12 512 $ 18,103 99.8 
13 601 $ 20,200 99.8 
14 1,017 $ 23,492 99.3 
15 1,162 $ 27,865 97.8 
16 1,107 $ 33,443 97.8 
17 1,023 $ 43,253 99.3 
18 1,145 $ 62,164 99.6 
19 1,190 $121,163 100 
TOTAL 15,830 $ 32,863 92.6 
(mean) 
Data sources: DMDC and Turner (1995). 
As can be seen in Table 4.1, ACOL values are fairly constant from years of service 
6 to 12, with a maximum difference of $1,411, and the lowest retention rates are 
observed in years of service 6 and 7. This corresponds to the period in which a 
majority of aviators complete· their initial minimum service requirement (MSR) 
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incurred in flight training. From years of service 13 to 19, ACOL values increase 
rapidly and retention rises from 92 to 100 percent. This is due to the increased 
attractiveness of the military retirement system as an individual draws closer to the 
20 year milestone. Furthermore, an individual's discount factor used in converting 
the COL to ACOL decreases as 20 years of service approaches. Overall, the mean, 
or average ACOL value is $32,863, and the mean retention rate is 92.6 percent. 
Table 4.2 shows the results of estimating the logit regression model. 
Table 4.2. Logit Regression Results for Retention of Navy Aviators 
with 6 to 19 YOS 
Variable Coefficient Wald Chi-square 
INTERCEPT -0.4211 10.59 
ACOL 0.00009 331.29 
MARRIED 0.6850 47.09 
NODEP 0.2606 58.48 
MINORITY -0.3184 5.05 
Model Chi-square= 565.057 with 4 DF (p=0.0001) 
* significant at the 99% confidence level 
** significant at the 95% confidence level 
Pr> Chi-square Notional Value 
0.0011* -0.4211 
0.0001 * $32,864 
0.0001 * 1 
0.0001 * 2.05 
.0246** 0.00 
All the variables in the estimated equation are statistically significant at the 95 
percent confidence level (or better). 
C. EFFECTS OF DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES ON RETENTION 
Using the notional person approach discussed in section 4.A and the mean 
values presented in the last column of Table 4.2, the effects of the demographic 
variables MARRIED, NODEP, and MINORITY on retention are examined below. 
We examine the effect of the ACOL variable in the next section. 
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MARRIED. Changing the notional value from I to 0, or from married to not 
married, holding all else constant, results in an estimated decrease in retention of2.14 
percent. This agrees with prior expectations in Chapter III section C. Benefits in 
kind, higher basic pay and housing allowances, and the increased value of services 
offered to spouses, such as medical care, all serve to increase a married individual's 
preference, or "taste", for a military lifestyle over a non-married individual's "taste" 
for a military lifestyle. 
NODEP. Similar to MARRIED, an increase in the number of dependents 
for a Naval aviator, holding all else constant, is estimateq to increase retention by 
0.5I2 percent at the mean or average observation. Again, greater benefits, primarily 
health care, are thought to raise the "tastes" for military life of aviators with depen-
dents. This agrees with prior expectations. 
MINORITY. Contrary to expectations in Chapter III, being a minority was 
· found to decrease retention by 0.826 percent. This could be due to differences in the 
net preference for a civilian life across racial lines. Minority aviators may have, on 
average, a higher net preference for civilian life than non-minority aviators. 
D. RESULTS OF CHANGES TO BONUS PAYS 
This section examines the effect of changes in aviation bonus pays on reten-
tion. This is done using the average treatment effect introduced in section 4.A by 
including and excluding the hypothetical bonus value in the calculation of the ACOL 
variable. Section I shows the effect of increasing ACIP by $50. Sections 2, 3, and 
4 show estimated results of increasing ACIP by $I 00, doubling ACP, and eliminating 
ACP, respectively. 
27 
1. Simulated Effect of Increasing ACIP Maximum Payment by $50 
from $650 to $700 a Month 
The average treatment effect method was used to determine the effect of 
increasing Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP) by $50 monthly from a maximum 
amount of$650 to $700 a month. Using the logit regression results in Table 4.2, the 
average treatment effect of this $50 per month increase in ACIP in presented in Table 
4.3. 
Table 4.3. Average Treatment Effect Analysis of 
an Increase of the Maximum ACIP from 
$650 Monthly to $700 Monthly 
Baseline retention rate without 92.55% 
increase in ACIP 
New retention rate with $50 92.76% 
increase in monthly ACIP 
Net Increase in retention +0.21% 
Source: DMDC and Turner (1995). Calculations by author. 
Taken over the sample of 15,830 Naval aviators, of which 14,651 remained in the 
Navy (92.6%) and, 1,179 (7.4%) separated, this equates to 31 aviators, or 2.63 percent 
ofthose who separated. That is, 31 aviators, who otherwise would have left the Navy, 
were induced to stay by the $50 monthly increase in ACIP. 
2. Simulated Effect of Increasing ACIP Maximum Payment by $100 
from $650 to $750 a Month 
Again, using the average treatment effect method and the logit results from 
Table 4.2, the effect of increasing the maximum monthly ACIP by $100 from $650 
to $750 a month is shown in Table 4.4~ Taken over the sample of 15,830 Naval 
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aviators, of which 14,651 remained in the Navy (92.6%) and, 1,179 (7 .4%) separated, 
this equates to 64 aviators, or 5.51 percent ofthose who separated, who otherwise 
would have left the Navy but were induced to stay by the $100 monthly increase in 
ACIP. 
Table 4.4. Average Treatment Effect Analysis of 
an Increase of the Maximum ACIP of 
$650 Monthly to $750 Monthly 
Baseline retention rate 92.55% 
without increase in ACIP 
New retention rate with $100 92.99% 
increase in monthly ACIP 
Net Increase in retention +0.44% 
Source: DMDC and Turner (1995). Calculations by author. 
3. Simulated Effect of Doubling the Aviation Career Pay (ACP) 
Bonus 
Using the average treatment effect method and Table 4.2 logit regression 
results, the effect of doubling the ACP payment amounts on retention are shown in 
Table 4.5. Appendix A shows the amounts of ACP by aviation community. Taken 
over the sample of 15,830 Naval aviators, of which 14,651 remained in the Navy 
(92.6%) and, 1,179 (7.4%) separated, this equates to 92 aviators in the ACP-eligible 
communities, or 7.63 percent of those who separated, who otherwise would have left 
the Navy but were induced to stay by the doubling of ACP. 
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Table 4.5. Average Treatment Effect Analysis of 
Doubling ACP Amounts 
Baseline retention rate 92.55% 
without doubling ACP 
bonus amounts 
New retention rate acp 93.18% 
bonus amounts doubled 
Net Increase in retention +0.63% 
Source: DMDC and Turner (1995). Calculations by author. 
4. Simulated Effect of Eliminating the Aviation Career Pay (ACP) 
Bonus 
Using the average treatment effect method and Table 4.2, the effect of 
eliminating the ACP payment altogether (shown in Appendix A) on retention is 
shown in Table 4.6. This is shown to illustrate the effectiveness of the existing ACP 
program. 
Table 4.6. Average Treatment Effect Analysis 
of Eliminating ACP Payments 
Baseline retention rate 92.55% 
without doubling ACP 
bonus amounts 
New retention rate acp 91.38% 
bonus amounts doubled 
Net Increase in -1.17% 
retention 
Source: DMDC and Turner (1995). Calculations by author. 
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Taken over the sample of 15,830 Naval aviators, of which 14,651 remained in the 
Navy (92.6%) and, 1,179 (7.4%) separated, this equates to 172 aviators in the ACP-
eligible communities, or 14.59 percent of those who stayed, who otherwise would 
have remained in the Navy under an ACP contract are estimated to separate from the 
Navy. 
E. COST -BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
Unlike the previous section, where the effects of changes to bonus pays were 
examined for the entire sample ofNaval aviators eligible to separate from 1990 - 1994 
(excluding 1991 ), this section examines the effects of changes to aviation bonus pays 
for only one year, 1992. This year was chosen because, of all the years studied, 1992 
had the largest number of aviators accepting Aviation Continuation Pay (ACP), and 
therefore was the most expensive year for that program. Overall, the 1992 data 
sample had 3,920 observations, of which 3,571, or 91.1 percent remained in the Navy. 
The remaining 349 Naval aviators, or 8.9 percent, separated from the Navy during the 
period; 355 of these 3,920 individuals entered into an ACP contract in 1992. 
To evaluate the economic efficiency of projected effects of changes to aviation 
bonus pays, a cost-benefit analysis is conducted. The cost of increasing either ACIP 
or ACP is compared to the cost of training an aviator. The cost savings from 
aviators who are induced to stay is considered the benefit of the program. If the costs 
associated with training a replacement for an aviator who separates are greater than 
the cost of the increase in bonus pay, then the increase in bonus pay will be judged to 
be cost-effective. On the other hand, if the cost of increasing the bonus pay is less 
that the cost of training the aviator, then the increase in bonus pay is not cost 
effective. 
Morrissey and Cylke (1990) attempted to determine the average and marginal 
costs of training Navy pilots. Average cost of training was defmed as the total of all 
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pilot training cost, divided by the number of pilots trained. This included all fixed 
and variable costs, such as airfield maintenance and aircraft repair costs, budgeted for 
pilot training. Marginal cost of training a Navy pilot is defined as 
those costs which will change with a given change in the number of 
pilots trained. Unlike average cost, marginal cost will normally 
exclude fixed and overhead costs since they would not be affected by 
small changes in the pilot training rate. 
Morrissey and Cylke determined the minimal marginal cost of training one additional 
pilot in the undergraduate and graduate training pipelines. Undergraduate flight 
training is the initial training, whereas graduate flight training is defined as 
completing the first advanced flight training in a specific fleet aircraft, (called CAT 
I training) and subsequent refresher training in the fleet aircraft for a pilot who has 
previous fleet experience (1 or more tours) in that aircraft (called CAT II training). 
Table 4.7 presents Morrissey and Cylke's calculated marginal and average cost 
figures for pilot training by type of aircraft. 
Table 4.7. Marginal and Average Cost of Navy Pilot Training 
by Aircraft Type 
Marginal costs are shown above Average costs, which are in (parenthesis). 
Aircraft Undergrad CATI CAT II Total Average 
Type Training Graduate Graduate Marginal Cost 
Training Training Cost 
F-14 $485,151 $457,922 $405,205 $1,348,278 $1,981,834 
($713,038) ($673,145) ($595,651) 
F/A-18 $485,151 $421,806 $350,856 $1,257,813 $1,848,851 
($713,038) ($620,055) ($515,758) 
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Table 4. 7 (Continued) 
Aircraft Undergrad CATI CAT II Total Average 
Type Training Graduate Graduate Marginal Cost 
Training Training Cost 
A-7 $485,151 $423,312 $311,269 $1,219,732 $1,792,872 
($713,038) ($622,269) ($457,565) 
A-6 $485,151 $428,672 $281,582 $1,195,676 $1,757,509 
($713,038) ($630,148) ($414,323) 
S-3 $485,151 $242,727 $188,274 $916,152 $1,346,609 
($713,038) ($356,808) ($276,763) 
P-3 $151,583 $127,549 $114,113 $393,515 $518,860 
($199,866) ($168,365) ($150,629) 
E-2 $151,583 $253,689 $295,383 $700,925 $924,641 
($199,866) ($334,869) ($389,906) 
H-3 $165,869 $188,661 $146,777 $501,307 $646,652 
($213,937) ($243,373) ($189,342) 
H-2 $165,869 $177,697 $148,590 $492,156 $634,847 
($213,937) ($229,229) ($191,681) 
H-60 $165,869 $138,241 N/A $304,110 $392,268 
($213,937) ($178,331) N/A 
H-53 $165,869 $292,732 $239,411 $698,012 $900,401 
($213,937) ($377,624) ($308,840) 
Source: Morrissey and Cylke (1990). 
Using the total marginal cost and the total average cost of training Navy pilots 
in Table 4.7 and the number of aviators in each aircraft community (as of 1992), the 
weighted-average marginal cost of training a Navy pilot aviator is $759,186 and the 
weighted-average average cost of training a Navy pilot is $1,073,602. Note that 
Morrissey and Cylke did not determine NFO training cost. However, for this study, 
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NFO training cost are assumed to be equal to pilot training cost even though NFO 
training costs are probably lower than pilot training costs because NFOs spend less 
training time in the aircraft (the most costly portion of training). Note that the 
marginal and average costs computations do not account for the cost of attrition 
during the entire training process. Attrition is factored into the undergraduate training 
cost but not the graduate training cost. Morrissey and Cylke state, 
to obtain one successful completion at the end of the undergraduate 
training pipeline requires that more than one trainee start at the 
beginning. Depending on the stage in which trainee attrition occurs, 
the cost of this loss can be significant (larger). · 
By using the weighted-average of the marginal training cost as a lower-bound cost 
estimate, and the weighted-average of the average training cost as an upper bound 
· cost estimate, a sensitivity analysis of increases in the ACIP or ACP program can be 
determined. If the ACIP and ACP program effects are cost-beneficial using these 
deliberately conservative training cost estimates, then we can be more confident that 
the programs are truly cost-effective (e.g., when full replacement costs have been 
included.) 
Section E.1 presents the cost-benefit analysis of simulating raising the 
maximum monthly ACIP from $650 to $700 for the 1992 sample of aviators. 
Sections 2 and 3 show the cost-benefit analysis of increasing ACIP by $100, and of 
doubling ACP payments for the 1992 sample of aviators, respectively. 
1. Cost-Benefit Analysis of Increasing ACIP Maximum Payment from 
$650 to $700 a Month Using the 1992 Sample 
Using only the Naval aviators eligible to separate from the Navy in 1992, and 
applying regression results from Table 4.2 to determine the average treatment effect, 
a $50 increase in the maximum monthly ACIP from $650 to $700 induces 8 Naval 
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aviators who otherwise would have left the Navy to choose to stay in. Using an 
upper-bound estimate of 10,000 aviators who would receive this additional $50 
monthly increase in ACIP, the additional cost to the Navy of implementing this new 
bonus would be $5,000,000. However, the training cost of the 8 Naval aviators 
induced to stay by the bonus, using both lower and upper-bound values is $6,073,488 
(= $759,186 * 8) to $8,588,816 (= $1,073,602 * 8). This yields a net benefit of 
$1,073,488 in favor of increasing the maximum ACIP monthly payment by $50 using 
the lower-bound training cost and a net benefit of $3,588,816 using the upper-bound 
training costs. The break-even training cost, which is the training cost that drives the 
net benefit to zero is $625,000. Since all of the training cost estimates exceed this 
amount, we are fairly confident that this proposed program is cost effective. 
2. Cost-Benefit Analysis of a $100 Monthly Increase in the Maximum 
ACIP from $650 to $750, Using 1992 Data 
Using only the Naval aviators eligible to separate from the Navy in 1992, and 
applying Table 4.2 to determine the average treatment effect of a $100 increase in the 
maximum ACIP monthly payment from $650 to $750, results in inducing 16 Naval 
aviators who otherwise would have left the Navy to choose to stay in. Using a upper-
bound estimate of 10,000 aviators who would receive this additional $100 a month 
increase in ACIP, the additional cost to the Navy of implementing this bonus increase 
would be $10,000,000. However, the training cost of the 16 Naval aviators induced 
to stay by the bonus is $12,146,976 (= $759,488 * 16) using lower-bound costs and 
$17,177,632 (= $1,073,602 * 16) using upper-bound costs. This yields a net benefit 
of$2,146,976 in favor of increasing the maximum ACIP monthly payment by $100 
when the lower-bound cost is used and $7,7177,632 when the upper-bound cost is 
used. Again, the break-even training cost of a $100 monthly increase in ACIP is 
$625,000, the same as in the simulation of the $50 a month increase in ACIP. 
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3. Expected Affects of Doubling ACP on the 1992 Sample of Naval 
Aviators Eligible to Separate from the Navy 
Using only the Naval aviators eligible to separate from the Navy in 1992, and 
applying Table 4.2 regression results to determine the average treatment effect of 
doubling ACP payment amounts induces 39 Naval aviators, in the ACP eligible 
communities, who otherwise would have left the Navy, to stay in. Prior to doubling 
ACP payment amounts, the non-discounted program cost for the 355 Naval aviators 
who accepted an ACP contract was $13,289,000 with a mean total payment of 
$37,434 per individual. After doubling ACP payments for these 355 aviators and for 
the additional 39 aviators induced to stay by the higher ACP bonus, program cost 
becomes $29,497,836, an increase of $16,208,836. The cost of training the 39 
aviators who otherwise would have left the Navy is $29,608,254 (= $759,488 * 39) 
ifthe lower-bound training cost is used. This yields a net benefit of$13,399,418 in 
support of doubling ACP payments. If upper-bound training cost figure is used, the 
cost of the 39 aviators who otherwise would have left the Navy is $41,870,478 (= 
$1,073,603 * 39). This yields a net benefit of$25,661,642 in favor of doubling ACP 
amounts. Bear in mind that due to attrition of aviation trainees, both lower-bound 
and upper-bound training cost are less the replacement cost of Naval aviators. If a 
higher replacement cost value used, the net cost savings would be substantially larger. 
The break-even training cost for doubling ACP payments is $415,611. 
36 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis developed an Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) model for Navy 
aviators. Using this framework, the effects of aviation bonus pays on aviator 
retention was examined. Given the statistical significance of the logit regression 
model used in this study, the ACOL model is a feasible approach for predicting the 
retention/separation decision ofNaval aviators. Furthermore, financial incentives, in 
the form of aviation bonus pay, have a significant impact on retention of Naval 
aviators. Specifically, this thesis finds: 
1. A $50 monthly increase in the maximum Aviation Career Incentive Pay 
(ACIP) from $650 to $700 a month results in a predicted increase in 
aviator retention of .209 percent. 
2. A $100 monthly increase in the maximum Aviation Career Incentive 
Pay (ACIP) from $650 to $750 a month results in a predicted increase 
in aviator retention of .435 percent. 
3. Doubling the yearly contract payment amounts of the Aviation 
Continuation Bonus Pay (ACP) is estimated to increase retention of 
Naval aviators by .625 percent. 
By comparing the cost of increasing the ACIP or ACP programs, with the cost of 
replacing the Naval aviators who otherwise would have left the Navy in the absence 
of the increased aviation bonus pays, this thesis showed that increases in aviation 
bonus pays are cost effective. By examining the 1992 data set of Naval aviators, it 
was found that the lower bound net benefit (in the form of training cost savings) of 
increasing the bonus pays of aviators who would have left the Navy was: 
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1. Between $1,073,488 and $3,588,488 for a $50 monthly increase in the 
maximum ACIP from $650 to $700. 
2. Between $2,146,976 and $7,177,632 for a $100 monthly increase in the 
maximum ACIP from $650 to $750. 
3. Between $13,399,418 and $25,661,642 for doubling the ACP yearly 
contract payment amounts. 
Bear in mind that if replacement costs, where attrition of aviation trainees is taken 
into account, vice training costs are used in the cost-benefit analysis, then the net 
benefit to the Navy from increasing aviation bonus pays would be even greater. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. ACP is Preferable to ACIP 
While increasing either ACIP or ACP is a cost effective way of increasing the 
retention of Naval aviators, this thesis recommends that increasing ACP is preferable 
to increasing ACIP. Increasing the maximum monthly ACIP involves paying all 
eligible aviators the increased bonus pay. Although this policy was shown to be cost-
effective in retaining aviators, the communities of the aviators induced to stay cannot 
be targeted. An increase in ACIP may induce aviators to stay in communities where 
there is no retention problem, such as the VA (A-6 Intruder) or HSL-Mkl (SH-2F 
Seasprite) communities. At the time of this report, the VA community is being 
phased out of the Navy and the HSL-Mkl community has been completely 
eliminated. On the other hand, increasing the yearly ACP payment allows manpower 
planners to target specific aviation communities where retention problems are 
projected to exist. Additionally, the ACP program can be offered only to pilots or 
flight-officers, depending on where shortages are expected. 
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2. Further Research 
Further research should continue by: 
a. Determining the true replacement cost of Naval Aviators. To ensure 
accurate cost-benefit analysis of increasing aviation bonus programs, the true 
replacement cost, by community, and by pilot and NFO designator, needs to be 
determined. 
b. Development of a data base containing observations on the post-service 
earnings of Naval aviators. The unique skills and experience of Naval aviators 
suggest that their civilian earnings potential may not be comparable to the earnings 
of non-aviation officers. Employment by the airlines or other aviation industries 
comes to mind. This would allow a more accurate determination of an individual's 
expected ACOL values, and thus, a more accurate determination of the effect of 
aviation bonus pays. 
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APPENDIX A. AVIATION CONTINUATION PAY 
Appendix A presents ACP eligible communities and the yearly amount each 
contract is worth. All dollar figures listed are in nominal dollars and have not been 
discounted to 1991 dollars. Table A.l shows ACP values for 1990. Tables A.2, A.3, 
and A.4 present values for years 1992, 1993, and 1994 respectively. 
Table A.l. ACP Eligible Communities and Yearly Contract Values for 1990 
Aviation Community Short Term Long Term ACP 
ACP Contract Contract (to 14 years) 
(2 years) Yearly Value 
Yearly Value 
VF (pilot) $6,000 $12,000 
VF (NFO) $3,000 $ 6,000 
VALNFA $6,000 $12,000 
V AM (pilot only) $6,000 $12,000 
VAQ (pilot) $6,000 $12,000 
VAQ(NFO) $3,000 $ 6,000 
VAW (pilot) $6,000 $12,000 
VAW(NFO) $3,000 $ 6,000 
VS (pilot only) $6,000 $12,000 
VP (pilot only) $5,000 $10,000 
VQ (EW jet pilot only) $6,000 $12,000 
VQ (TACAMO/EP-3 pilot) $5,000 $10,000 
VQ (TACAMO/EP-3 NFO) $3,000 $ 6,000 
HC,HSL $4,500 $ 9,000 
HM,HS $3,000 $ 6,000 
Source: All Navy Message 157/89. 
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Table A.2. ACP Eligible Communities and Yearly Contract Values for 1992 
Aviation Community Short Term ACP Long Term ACP 
Contract (2 years) Contract (to 14 years) 
Yearly Value Yearly Value 
VF (pilot) $6,000 $12,000 
VF (NFO) $3,000 $ 6,000 
VALNFA $6,000 $12,000 
V AM (pilot only) $6,000 $12,000 
VAQ (pilot) $6,000 $12,000 
VAQ(NFO) $3,000 $ 6,000 
VAW (pilot) $6,000 $12,000 
VAW (NFO) $3,000 $ 6,000 
VS (pilot only) $6,000 $12,000 
VP (pilot only) $5,000 $10,000 
VQ (EW jet pilot only) $6,000 $12,000 
VQ (TACAMO/EP-3 pilot) $5,000 $10,000 
VQ (TACAMO/EP-3 NFO) $3,000 $ 6,000 
HC $4,500 $ 9,000 
HS,HSL,HM $3,000 $ 6,000 
Source: Navy Administration Message 147/91. 
Note: The only difference between the 1990 and the 1992 ACP program is that in 1992 
HSL pilots bonus has been lowered from $4,500 to $3,000 for a short-term contract 
and from $9,000 to $6,000 for a long-term contract. 
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Table A.3. ACP Eligible Communities 
and Yearly Contract Values 
for 1993 
Aviation Community Long-term ACP 
Contract (to 14 
years) Yearly 
Value 
VF (pilot) $12,000 
VFA (pilot) $12,000 
VA (pilot) $ 9,000 
VAQ (pilot) $12,000 
VAW (pilot) $12,000 
VS (pilot) $ 9,000 
VQ (EW jet pilot) $12,000 
VQ (TACAMO/EP-3 pilot) $12,000 
Source: Navy Administration Message 185/92. 
Note: In 1993, short-term contracts were no longer 
offered. Additionally, NFO's, VP, and heli-
copter communities were no longer offered 
ACP bonuses. 
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Table A.4. ACP Eligible Communities and 
Yearly Contract Values for 1994 
Aviation Community Long-term ACP 
Contract (to 14 years) 
Yearly Value 
VF (pilot) $ 6,000 
VFA (pilot) $12,000 
VAQ (pilot) $12,000 
VS (pilot) $12,000 
VQ (EW jet pilot) $12,000 
VQ (TACAMO/EP3 pilot) $12,000 
HM (pilot) $ 9,000 
Source: Navy Administration Message 215/93 
Note: 1994 ACP program removed the VA and VAW 
communities but added the HM community, compared 
to the 1993 ACP program. 
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APPENDIX B. ESTIMATES OF THE EXPECTED MILITARY PAY 
Appendix B presents the estimates of the expected military pay by YOS. Table 
B.1 shows the pay grade distribution, ofthe Naval aviators in the 1992 data sample 
by YOS, which was used to computed expected military pay. Table B.2 shows the 
values for Naval aviators receiving a maximum ACIP of $650 a month. Table B.3 
and B.4 show the respective estimates when ACIP is increased to a maximum 
monthly amount of$700 and $750. All values are in 1991 real dollars. 
Table B.l. Pay Grade Distribution of Naval Aviators by YOS 
YOS 0-3, Lieutenant 0-4, 0-5, 
Lieutenant Commander 
Commander 
6 100% - -
7 100% - -
8 100% - -
9 100% - -
10 58.04% 41.96% -
11 0.71% 92.90% 
-
12 - 100% -
13 - 100% -
14 - 95.47% 4.53% 
15 - 56.86% 43.14% 
16 - 28.00% 72.00% 
17 - 27.41% 72.59% 
18 - 29.12% 70.88% 
19 - 27.50% 72.50% 
Source: 1992 DMDC Officer Master File. 
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Table B.2. Expected Military Pay by YOS for Naval Aviators with 
Maximum ACIP of $650 
YOS Exp. Mil. Pay, Single Max. Exp. Mil Pay, Married Max. 
ACIP $650 monthly ACIP $650 monthly 
6 $35,638 $36,617 
7 $42,302 $43,218 
8 $42,302 $43,218 
9 $43,353 $44,332 
10 $44,347 $45,326 
11 $47,663 $48,612 
12 $47,866 $48,846 
13 $49,751 $50.731 
14 $49,835 $50,836 
15 $52,531 $53,720 
16 $53,307 $54,636 
17 $55,902 $57,234 
18 $55,833 $57,157 
19 $57,165 $58,496 
Retirement Pay $24,484 $24,484 
Source: 1992 Naval Officer Pay Table, DMDC, and Turner (1995). 
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Table B.3. Expected Military Pay by YOS for Naval Aviators 
with Maximum ACIP of $700 
YOS Exp. Mil. Pay, Single Max. Exp. Mil Pay, Married 
ACIP $700 monthly Max. ACIP $700 monthly 
6 $35,938 $36,617 
7 $42,902 $43,881 
8 $42,902 $43,881 
9 $43,953 $44,932 
10 $44,599 $45,578 
11 $48,220 $49,199 
12 $48,466 $49,446 
13 $50,351 $51,330 
14 $49,862 $50,863 
15 $52,790 $53,978 
16 $53,739 $55,068 
17 $56,337 $57,669 
18 $56,258 $57,582 
19 $57,175 $58,496 
Retirement Pay $24,484 $24,484 
Source: 1992 Naval Officer Pay Table, DMDC, and Turner (1995). 
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Table B.4. Expected Military Pay by YOS for Naval Aviators 
with Maximum ACIP of $750 
YOS Exp. Mil. Pay, Single Max. Exp. Mil Pay, Married 
ACIP $750 monthly Max. ACIP $750 monthly 
6 $35,638 $ 36,617 
7 $43,502 $ 44,481 
8 $43,502 $ 44,481 
9 $44,553 $ 45,532 
10 $44,851 $ 45,830 
11 $48,777 $ 49,757 
12 $49,066 $ 50,046 
13 $50,952 $ 51,931 
14 $49,889 $ 50,891 
15 $53,048 $ 54,237 
16 $54,171 $ 55,500 
17 $56,772 $581,057 
18 $56,684 $ 58,007 
19 $57,165 $ 58,496 
Retirement Pay $24,484 $ 24,484 
Source: 1992 Naval Officer Pay Table, DMDC, and Turner (1995). 
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APPENDIX C. CIVILIAN AGE-EARNINGS PROFILES FOR 
NAVAL A VIA TORS 
Appendix C presents the estimated civilian pay used in calculating the returns 
of leaving immediately and the expected future earning after military retirement. 
Tables C.l shows the expected civilian earnings for Naval aviators who left the Navy 
with less than 20 years of service (retirement eligibility point) and Table C.2 shows 
the expected civilian earnings for Naval aviators after retirement. 
Recall, that military retirement pay equal to $24,484 annually is included in 
calculating the post-service income stream in addition to the expected civilian 
earnings presented in Table C.2. 
Table C.1. Estimated Annual Civilian Earnings by Age for Naval 
Aviators Who Leave the Military Before 20 YOS, in 
1991 Dollars 
The earnings function for Table C.1 is : 
civilian earnings= exp(7.622541 + 0.11274*AGE- 0.001033*(AGEA2) + 0.1954 
MARRIED)* (136.21124). 
AGE Civ. Earnings, Single Civ. Earnings, Married 
Naval Aviators Naval Aviators 
25 $19,718 $23,974 
26 $20,939 $25,458 
27 $22,189 $26,978 
28 $23,466 $28,529 
29 $24,764 $30,108 
30 $26,081 $31,709 
31 $27,410 $33,325 
32 $28,748 $34,952 
33 $30,090 $36,583 
34 $31,428 $38,210 
35 $32,759 $39,828 
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Table C.l (Continued) 
AGE Civ. Earnings, Single Civ. Earnings, Married 
Naval Aviators Naval Aviators 
36 $34,075 $41,429 
37 $35,371 $43005 
38 $36,641 $44,548 
39 $37,878 $46,052 
40 $39,076 $47,508 
41 $40,229 $48,910 
42 $41,330 $50,248 
43 $42,373 $51,517 
44 $43,354 $52,709 
45 $44,265 $53,817 
46 $45,102 $54,835 
47 $45,861 $55,757 
48 $46,535 $56,578 
49 $47,123 $57,292 
50 $47,619 $57,895 
51 $48,021 $58,384 
52 $48,327 $58,755 
53 $48,534 $59,007 
54 $48,641 $59,138 
55 $48,648 $59,146 
56 $48,555 $59,033 
57 $48,362 $58,798 
58 $48,070 $58,443 
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Table C.l (Continued) 
AGE Civ. Earnings, Single Civ. Earnings, Married 
Naval Aviators Naval Aviators 
59 $47,681 $57,970 
60 $47,198 $57,383 
61 $46,623 $56,648 
62 $45,960 $55,879 
63 $45,214 $54,971 
64 $44,387 $53,966 
65 $43,486 $52,870 
Source: Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) 1990. 
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Table C.2. Estimated Annual Civilian Earnings by Age for 
Naval Aviators Who Leave the Military after 20 
YOS, in 1991 Dollars 
The earnings function for Table C.2 is : 
civilian earnings= exp(7.381707 + 0.11274*AGE- 0.001033*(AGE/\2) + 0.1954 
MARRIED)* (136.2/124). 
AGE Civ. Earnings Civ. Earnings 
Single Naval Aviators Married Naval Aviators 
39 $29,768 $36,193 
40 $30,713 $37,340 
41 $31,619 $38,442 
42 $32,484 $39,494 
43 $33,304 $40,491 
44 $34,075 $41,428 
45 $34,791 $42,299 
46 $35,449 $43,099 
47 $36,045 $43,824 
48 $36,575 $44,468 
49 $37,037 $45,030 
50 $37,427 $45,504 
51 $37,743 $45,888 
52 $37,983 $46,180 
53 $38,146 $46,378 
54 $38,231 $46,481 
55 $38,236 $46,487 
56 $38,163 $46,398 
57 $38,011 $46,213 
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Table C.2 (Continued) 
AGE Civ. Earnings Civ. Earnings 
Single Naval Aviators Married Naval Aviators 
58 $37,781 $45,935 
59 $37,476 $45,563 
60 $37,096 $45,101 
61 $36,645 $44,552 
62 $36,124 $43,919 
63 $35,537 $43,205 
64 $34,887 $42,416 
65 $34,179 $41,554 
Source: Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) 1990. 
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